Book Review

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In Not War, Not Peace George Perkovich and Toby Dalton highlight India’s inability to respond to a terrorist attack that is “perceived to be affiliated with Pakistan”(9). India’s strategic aim is to “motivate Pakistani leaders to act … to prevent future attacks on it, and if an attack occurs, to desist from escalating in reaction to India’s response”(5). To do so, they argue India requires a compellent strategy that draws from various dimensions of national power rather than a deterrent strategy because Pakistani decision makers—particularly those in the Army and the ISI [Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency]—have no interest in preventing terrorist attacks in India. After expositing important problems in Indian decision-making processes, they explore a variety of compellent options including ground, air, nuclear, covert, and nonviolent courses of coercive action.

There is much to recommend in this book. The authors unremittingly identify the myriad crippling bureaucratic problems with Indian higher defense organization. Inter alia, they contend that the military is not integrated into civilian decision making; the services resist jointness; the Defence Research and Development Organization has a monopoly on defense development but often fails to deliver; the Ministry of Defense often fails to make important acquisition deals in part because it lacks a specialized cadre of defense professionals; and there is little political will to redress these sundry hindrances. Most exigently, India requires “policies and capabilities to decisively punish Pakistan in the event of another major terrorist attack against India” (27) but has not rigorously analyzed, much less articulated, such a strategy nor debated the resources and methods that could be reasonably acquired and deployed to “move Pakistani leaders to curtail the terrorist threat” (28). Consequently, India practices a “de facto strategy of nonviolent resistance to Pakistan” (8). While the authors thoughtfully deliberate the potential benefits and perils of exercising the alternative compellent tools, they demure from proffering recommendations because they believe this is a task for India’s abundant competent strategists. This is a prevatication: if there were such a profusion of strategists, why has India failed to develop such a policy despite facing terrorism from Pakistan since 1947?

However, Not War, Not Peace has disquieting flaws. First, Perkovich and Dalton misspecify India’s challenge. Throughout, they use exculpatory language to imply that anti-India terrorist groups are not principally tools of Pakistan’s military and the ISI. This is a reckless misestimate. The authors focus upon the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). All available evidence suggests that Pakistan’s army and ISI actively train, arm, fund LeT as well as facilitate and plan LeT’s operations in India. Therefore, India’s task is to compel Pakistan’s ISI and army to cease providing material support to the organization and desist from deploying it to kill Indians as a foundational tool of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The authors’ repeated efforts to exonerate the state from using terrorism in this way—despite its requirements under UN Security Council Resolution 1373 to prevent terrorist attacks from its soil—perversely normalizes Pakistan’s unacceptable behavior.

Second, the authors contend—despite massive evidence to the contrary—that Pakistan exercises very little control over LeT. They point to Pakistan’s mixed record in its ongoing military operations in the North Waziristan tribal agency (Zarb-e-Azab) as evidence that Pakistan cannot shut down, disarm, and demobilize LeT, based in the Punjab. Pakistan’s mixed performance in Waziristan is due to the fact the army is waging a selective war there. It first hopes to flip militants to fight in Afghanistan or in India and then, only when these efforts fail, eliminate them through military force. It is well known in academic, military, and intelligence circles that the army relocated so-called key targets of the operations (the Haqqani network, another state asset) before Zarb-e-Azab began. The authors do not acknowledge that the vast majority of the army’s assets are located in the Punjab.
Third, Perkovich and Dalton imply that LeT can be as lethal as it is without state support. This conflicts with the state of knowledge about the group, which holds that its lethality stems in large measure from the vast state support it enjoys. LeT’s leaders freely roam around Pakistan where they recruit, raise funds, and train for military operations. The group’s headquarters received subsidies from the Punjab government and Pakistan’s police forces and ISI provide active security for this organization because they are important state assets.

Fourth, the authors make inconsistent assumptions about when India is likely to act alone. India’s debated strategy of “Cold Start” calls for highly mobile units to deploy rapidly across the international border to seize territory before the international community forces a cease-fire. It can use this territory to force Pakistan to forego its territorial claims on Indian-administered Kashmir. When assessing Cold Start, they exclude the critical role of the international community in keeping this conflict limited and proffer the specter of escalation that would ensue as Indian commanders sought to seize ever-more territory. Yet when they discuss nonviolent strategies, they acknowledge India must forge coalitions for these options to fructify. The authors appear to choose arbitrarily when India is likely to act alone or in coalition, and this choice influences the outcome of their assessment to privilege nonviolent strategies.

These defects are in addition to other factual errors in Not War, Not Peace. Perkovich and Dalton assert that Pakistan was motivated to pursue nuclear weapons after it lost half of its territory in 1971, when India intervened in the East Pakistan civil war that resulted in an independent Bangladesh (183). In fact, Z. A. Bhutto began the quest for nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s. They erroneously claim that the Pakistan army began raising jihadis in Afghanistan in 1979 after the Russians invaded Afghanistan (35), when it began doing so in 1974. They rehearse the popular canard that “the Pakistani military command recognizes that the state must impose a monopoly on violence perpetrated within and from Pakistani territory” (37). The facts belie this claim. What the army aims to do is regain control of its former proxies who have turned against the state, such as the Pakistani Taliban and related militant groups, while continuing to work with those groups that have remained loyal, like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Moreover, Pakistan has never tried to limit LeT’s access to the public space or deprive it of state-provided security and perquisites.

These errors, along with Perkovich and Dalton’s gross misspecification of the problem, call into question the utility of their otherwise cogent analytical exercise.
QUERIES TO THE AUTHOR

Q1. AU: Your review has been edited for grammar, clarity, and conformity to journal style. Please read the review to make sure that your meaning has been retained. Thank you.

Q2. AU: The journal avoids the use of italics for emphasis. I have removed the italics here and elsewhere. Please note that you can reinstate any italics that are needed for clarity.