

IPOL 376-01
Pakistan: Caught Between the Masjid, the Military and Militants
Fall 2013
Professor: C. Christine Fair, Ph.D.

Background to Pakistan and this Course

Pakistan has been unrelenting – yet consistently unsuccessful – in its efforts to take control of Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistan initiated three wars over Kashmir (in 1947-48, 1965, and 1999) and, in an effort to coerce India to make some concession on the disposition of the region, it has supported an array of Islamist militant proxies which operate in Kashmir and throughout India. Motivated by a neuralgic fear of India, since the 1960s Pakistan has employed Islamist proxies in Afghanistan in an attempt to limit India's political influence and physical presence there.

Despite Pakistan's failure to make even modest progress towards attaining Kashmir, in recent decades Pakistan's revisionist goals have actually broadened in scope. Since the early 1970s, Pakistan has sought to resist, if not outright retard, India's inevitable, if uneven, ascendance, both in the region and beyond. Despite the fact that India decisively defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war, with half of Pakistan's territory and population lost when East Pakistan became Bangladesh, Pakistan continues to view itself as India's peer competitor and demands that it be treated as such by the United States and others.

Having failed to win any of its wars with India or to marshal the diplomatic or political resources to change the status quo, Pakistan has pursued a nuclear capability since the 1970s. The Pakistani nuclear program and Pakistan's notorious history of proliferating to other states (epitomized by Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear black-marketeering), has long been a source of discomfort for the United States and other international actors. As Pakistan's nuclear weapons program advanced from an incipient capability towards a covert nuclear program, and finally into an overt nuclear deterrent, Pakistan has become increasingly confident in its use of Islamist militancy as a tool of foreign policy. Its nuclear deterrent raises the cost of any Indian punitive campaign in retaliation against an attack emanating from Pakistan linked militants and thus diminishes the chance of a conventional conflict. Pakistan's rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal—which includes tactical nuclear weapons—also ensures that the United States and other international actors will intervene as early as possible in any future conflict with India. Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, along with international fears of further proliferation (whether accidental or deliberate) provide it with virtual impunity in its use of jihadi proxies while at the same time ensuring that the international community is unlikely to leave Pakistan to its own dangerous devices.

Given the army's long domination of the state – and the army's long association with Islamist militancy and nuclear proliferation – policy discourse on Pakistan is obsessed with the possibility that the army will split under the strain of Islamism. Policy makers and analysts have long worried about

the purported Islamization of the Pakistan Army, fearing that some Pakistani military personnel may support Islamist terrorism in the region and beyond. Others frequently link this supposed greater Islamization with deepening anti-Americanism within the army. Since the army will remain Pakistan's center of gravity for the policy-relevant future, it continues to receive the bulk of attention.

This course aims to provide a deep dive into Pakistan's origins. During this semester, we will first study the conditions that gave rise to the state in the first instance, including the important role of communal and identity politics. We will then explore the processes of partition and its legacy for Pakistan. We will seek to understand how and why Pakistan descended into authoritarianism whereas India developed into a (sometimes problematic but nonetheless robust) democracy. We will also seek to understand the origins of the Pakistan army's strategic goals and the tools with which it has sought to pursue those goals. Finally, we will explore the fraught relations between Pakistan and the United States.

Course Learning Goals

- Understand the conditions that gave rise to Pakistan as the British departed South Asia.
- Develop an appreciation of the enduring influence of the Partition of the sub-continent and its consequences.
- Compare and contrast various competing accounts for the rise of authoritarianism in Pakistan and the chronic weaknesses of its democratic institutions.
- Become acquainted with Pakistan's security perceptions and the objectives and the tools it has developed to secure them.
- Grasp the role of Islam in the state since 1947.
- Garner insights into the myriad Islamist groups—including militant groups—the state has developed since 1947.
- Review the fraught history of US-Pakistan relations.

This is **not** a course on “current events.” If you expect that we will devote considerable time to what is in the newspaper, this is **not** the course for you. The course aims to enable you to **understand** the current events in the region. You are welcome to raise events that arise that are salient to the topics under study in a given week as well as events that are **momentous** for the region that do not particularly relate to the topics of the week. These will be rare and must indeed be momentous rather than quotidian events that characterize the region.

This is not a lecture-style course; rather, it is a seminar. I expect all students to come prepared and engage in a class that is structured around questions and answers to illuminate key aspects of the course. While I will end the course discussion with key takeaways, you are expected to fully contribute.

Assessing Learning

To assess students' progress in meeting this course's learning objectives, students will take two quizzes, described below. Students will also write a final analytical paper on a topic to be determined at a later date.

Quizzes: There will be two quizzes that will be comprised of short answer and essay questions. These exams will be “take home,” open book, and open-net BUT time-limited. They will be administered via Blackboard. Collaboration is expressly forbidden and will be treated as an honor code violation. *Quizzes that are submitted late will receive a failing grade. Because glitches do happen, save the confirmation email you will receive when the quiz is submitted. Always include yourself on the CC line as evidence. The onus will be on you to provide evidence of timely submission.*

Final Paper: Students will submit a 15-page final paper for this course. I expect you to rely upon course readings rather than conduct extensive research outside of the scope of the course.

Procedures for Submitting Final Paper

- All students must ensure that their name and email appears on all materials submitted for review.
- ALL documents must be submitted in Word — not PDF — as I use the “Track Changes” function for feedback. Also, ensure that pages are numbered.
- ALL documents should be double spaced, 12-pt font, with one inch margins.
- *Failure to adhere to the maximum page length and parameters will be penalized by a one-third letter grade deduction. For example, an A paper will become A-. This is to ensure that everyone has the same space within which they can make an effective argument (See paper writing guidelines in Appendix B).*

Policy on Lateness: Late papers will be subject to grade diminution, unless there is an extraordinary circumstance (e.g. illness). Papers will lose one full letter grade for each day late. Thus after one day delay, an A paper becomes a B paper. After two days, it becomes a C paper.

Class Participation and Commentary: Students are expected to participate actively in class discussions. Class participation includes completing assigned readings, attending all classes (unless a student is ill or has some other emergency), and contributing to class discussion.

I strongly encourage you to take notes on the readings to facilitate recall and discussion during class. Please note the main argument of the readings, the empirical bases for their argument, specific important details, and whether you agree or disagree with the theses advanced.

Final course grades

You will receive grades commensurate with the quality of the work irrespective of the performance of others in the class. (That is: this course is not graded on a curve.) For a sample of grading criteria, please see Appendix A.

10%: For class participation, which is defined by attendance (5%) and completing readings and contributing to class discussions (5%).

20%: First quiz.

20%: Second quiz

50%: Final paper

Policy on Grade Disputes: I make every effort to be fair, but grading of products for this course is ultimately subjective. If you believe that I was unfair in my assessment, you must request a reconsideration of your grade within **48 hours of receiving your grade**. However, be aware that while I may have mistakenly assessed your paper downward by overlooking some critical virtue(s), I may also have missed serious flaws upon first review and unfairly assessed it upward. *My re-grade of your paper will reflect the results of this review, be it positive, negative, or neutral. Make your case wisely.*

Required Books

- Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2004).
- Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie, 2005).
- Ayesha Jalal. *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- Yasmin Khan. *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
- Dennis Kux. *The United States and Pakistan: 1947-2000* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2001).
- Bruce Riedel. *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
- Ian Talbot. *Pakistan: A Modern History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Notes

If you have a documented physical or learning disability, I will be glad to make appropriate accommodations. Please contact me by so that we can discuss these arrangements.

If you anticipate any conflicts between this schedule and your religious obligations, please inform me so that we can make alternate arrangements.

Academic honesty

Please be certain that you understand Georgetown's policy on academic honesty. The relevant section of the Graduate Bulletin is at:

<http://gervaseprograms.georgetown.edu/honor/system/53516.html>.

Note the Standards of Conduct available at:

<http://gervaseprograms.georgetown.edu/honor/system/53519.html>.

According to the Standards of Conduct noted above, Plagiarism is defined as

“Plagiarism, in any of its forms, and whether intentional or unintentional, violates standards of academic integrity. Plagiarism is the act of passing off as one’s own the ideas or writings of another (see "What is Plagiarism?"). While different academic disciplines have different modes for attributing credit, all recognize and value the contributions of individuals to the general corpus of knowledge and expertise. Students are responsible for educating themselves as to the proper mode of attributing credit in any course or field. Faculty may use various methods to assess the originality of students' work. For example, faculty may submit a student's work to electronic search engines, including Turnitin.com, a service to which the Honor Council and the Provost subscribe. Note that plagiarism can be said to have occurred without any affirmative showing that a student’s use of another’s work was intentional.”

Course Outline

Class 1 (Wed. Aug. 28): The Raj and the Demand for Pakistan

Thomas Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U. of California Press, 2007), pp. 1-15 (Introduction).

Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India* (New York: OUP, 1994): 187-350.

R.J. Moore, “Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1983): 529-561.

Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, Chapter 1-4 (pp. 1-94).

Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): pp.9-24.

Class 2 (Mon. Sept. 9): Cracking the Raj - Partition & Portents of Conflict

Rabia Umar Ali, *Empire in Retreat: The Story of India’s Partition* (Karachi: OUP, 2012):1-148.

Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan*, pp. 1-128, 205-210.

Shereen Ilahi, “The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Fate of Kashmir,” *India Review* Vol. 2, No. 1 (2003): 77-102.

Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, pp. 25-44.

Indian Independence Act of 1947, original text available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1947/30/pdfs/ukpga_19470030_en.pdf.

Class 3 (Mon. Sept. 16): Pakistan - Born an Insecure State

Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington D.C.: CEIP, 2005): pp. 1-50.

Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, pp. 49-135.

Ian Talbot, *Pakistan*. Chapter 4, pp. 95-124.

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan* (New York: Palgrave, 2000): pp. 1-56

Class 4 (Mon. Sept. 23): Pakistan's Ill-fated Democracy

Ian Talbot, *Pakistan*. Chapters 5-7, pp. 125-214.

Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, pp. 136-276.

Christophe Jaffrelot, "India and Pakistan: Interpreting the Divergence of Two Political Trajectories," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (July 2002): pp. 251-267.

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan* (New York: Palgrave, 2000): 57-120.

Class 5 (Mon. Sept. 30): Kashmir Background and Wars: Enduring Rivalry?

T.V. Paul, "Causes of the India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry," in T.V. Paul Ed. *The India-Pakistan Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 3-24.

Vali Nasr, "National Identities and the India-Pakistan Conflict," in T.V. Paul, ed., *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 178-201.

Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947*, pp. 15-50.

Shuja Nawaz, "The First Kashmir War Revisited," *India Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Pages 115 -154, (2008).

Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003): 14-101.

Class 6 (Mon. Oct. 7): Breaking Pakistan

Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947*, pp. 51-78

Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, pp. 57-129.

Owen Bennett Jones, *Eye of the Storm* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 146-186.

Christophe Jaffrelot, "East Bengal: Between Islam and Regional Identity," in Christophe Jaffrelot Ed. *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins*, (London: Anthem, 2002): pp. 39-60.

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan* (New York: Palgrave, 2000): 121-141.

The First Quiz is Due on Oct. 7 at 5 pm.

Class 7 (Oct. 21): The Rise of Zia and the Increasing Role of Islam in the Army

Ian Talbot, *Pakistan*, Chapters 8 and 9, pp. 215-283.

Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002): 250-280.

Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (London: Hurst, 2009): pp. 81-15; 147-179.

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, pp. 165-188.

Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Law*, pp. 277-328.

Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan*, pp.131-157.

Class 8 (Oct. 28): The Soviet Jihad and the Birth of the Taliban

Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, pp.159-197.

Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 93-164; 165-238.

Barnett Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): 178-280.

Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, "Introduction," in Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi Eds. *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008): pp. 1-59.

Abdulkader Sinno, "Explaining the Taliban's Ability to Mobilize the Pashtuns," in Crews and Tarzi Ed., pp. 59-89.

Naematollah Nojumi, "The Rise and Fall of the Taliban," in Crews and Tarzi Ed., pp. 9.-117.

Class 9 (Mon. Nov. 4): Islamization of Pakistan and its Impacts

Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Penguin, 2011), pp. 3-40 (Chapter 1).

Mariam Abou Zahab, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan," in Christophe Jaffrelot Ed. *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?* (London: Zed, 2002), pp.115-128.

S. V. R. Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 139-180 (2000).

Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection* (London: Hurst, 2002): pp.12-82.

Class 10 (Mon. Nov. 11): Nuclearization of South Asia

Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 178-204 (1999).

Sumit Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," *International Security* (Fall 2008), Vol. 33, No. 2: 45-70.

Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947*, pp. 101-145.

S. Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia*. Pp. 1-140.

Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad* (London: Routledge, 2007). pp. 172-205; 236-239.

Timothy Hoyt, "Kargil: The Nuclear Dimension," in Peter R. Lavoy Ed. *Asymetric Warfare in South Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 146-170

Class 11 (Mon. Nov. 18): Pakistan and the GWOT

C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan's War Within," *Survival*, Vol. 51, No. 5 (2009).

Ashley J. Tellis, *Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance* (Washington D.C.: CEIP, January 2008).

Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2012).

Ayesha Siddiqi, "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2011): pp. 149-162

Paul Staniland, "Caught in the Muddle: America's Pakistan Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 34, No. 1 (2011): pp. 133-148.

C. Christine Fair, "The Militant Challenge in Pakistan," *Asia Policy*, Vol. 11 (January 2011): pp. 105-137.

Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan's Dangerous Game," *Survival*, Vol. 49, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 15-32.

Class 12 (Mon. Nov. 25): Civil Military Relations in the Ideological State

Talbot, *Pakistan*, Chapter 10-12, pp. 327-440.

Haqqani, *Pakistan*, pp. 199-311

Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, pp. 97-160

Class 13 (Mon. Dec. 2): US-Pakistan Relations

Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, pp. 1-115, 147-320.

The Second Quiz is due on Dec. 6 at 5 pm.

Final Papers Due at 5 pm on December 11, 2013.

Paper Topics:

I suggest several topics below. You can either use one of these topics, or select a topic on your own. If you chose this option, I suggest that you discuss your topic with me. You can always submit papers earlier than the noted deadline if that suits your schedule.

As there are usually no right or wrong answers, papers will be judged on the soundness of the argument, robustness of data mobilized to support the argument, and the suitability of the methodology of analysis employed. Remember: all papers must present evidence for the argument.

Suggested Topics – these will be updated and expanded on the basis of class discussion before the final exam:

- Identify key inheritances from the Raj which you believe influenced Pakistani state behavior, and explain how these imperial legacies did so.
- Explain the failure of the Muslim League to transform from an “independence movement” into a political party. Compare with the Indian National Congress.
- Explain Pakistan’s descent into autocracy. Are comparisons to India’s democratic development fair? Why or why not?
- How did partition influence the army’s thinking about India?
- Is Kashmir the cause or symptom of the Indo-Pakistan Security competition?
- Why has the Pakistan Army become a driver in Pakistani governance while the Indian army has remained subject to civilian control and on the periphery of power in India?
- What prospects exist for U.S. transformative policies towards Pakistan to fructify?
- Can India meaningfully and positively influence Pakistani strategic perceptions and decision-making?
- Under what conditions, if any, can Pakistan accept Afghanistan as a neighbor rather than a client and abandon its long-standing use of Islamist and/or militant actors to prosecute its interests in Afghanistan?
- How will the rise of India affect Pakistan’s strategic calculus and policy? How will the rise of India influence future Pakistani behavior in the region? Will Pakistan acquiesce to an ever more dominant India and seek some sort of accommodation, or will it become ever more recalcitrant, relying upon unconventional means to achieve its objectives? Are there other options that Pakistan may develop to counter a rising India?
- What role does the Pakistan Army play in shaping the ideology of Pakistan, and with what consequences?

Appendix A: Sample Explanation of Grading Criteria

Grade	GPA	
A	4.0	Brilliant and <u>original</u> work; nearly publishable. Commendably clear and thoroughly analytical; comprehensively supported by, and systematically substantiated with, voluminous empirical evidence.
A-	3.67	Excellent work; powerful analysis with distinctive, well-structured argument; critical and full awareness of the literature alongside masterful use of empirical evidence to support and substantiate the arguments presented.
B+	3.33	Very good; fine analysis with a coherent argument, most of the most important points are developed in a structured discussion; well-substantiated with clear and firm command of supporting empirical evidence.
B	3.0	Good; sound analytical skill shown from identification and understanding of the core intellectual problem accompanied by a clear discussion of the subject substantiated with some (albeit, perhaps insufficient) empirical evidence.
B-	2.67	Satisfactory; basic analytical skills apparent from identification of the intellectual problem and an insufficiently developed discussion of it. Poorly structured with inadequate empirical evidence provided.
C+	2.33	Average; little analysis and an insufficiently developed argument. <i>Some</i> , albeit cursory knowledge of the main intellectual problem; <i>some</i> key empirical points may have been identified and touched on, basic, but are anemically developed. No detailed familiarity with the literature evident.
C	2.0	Below average. weak analysis and an incoherent argument, bare evidence of ability to identify intellectual problem, little use of empirical evidence and minimal knowledge of literature.
F	0.0	Totally unsatisfactory, absence of argument, analysis; and little if any reference to, much less knowledge of, the literature

Appendix B: Paper Guidance:

Your papers must have a cover sheet with your full name, your e-mail address, and title of your paper. It must be **e-mailed** to me by the stated time frame or suffer penalties noted above. I will return all comments to you electronically with your comments and grades.

Paper structure:

In most cases I am not looking for one ‘right answer.’ Rather, I want you to properly frame an argument, mobilize data in support of your argument, and cogently exposit your answer within the stated length of the paper. *Papers are not editorials. All arguments must be buttressed by data and reliance upon peer-reviewed scholarly materials.*

Each paper should have a brief introduction (consisting of perhaps 2 paragraphs). The first paragraph of the introduction should state 1) what your question is; 2) why your question is important; 3) what sources you will use to answer it; 4) and a brief statement describing your argument (e.g. “Ultimately, this paper concludes that...”)

The concluding paragraph of your introduction should provide a roadmap wherein you describe BRIEFLY the structure of your paper. For example, “My argument is advanced through X sections. In the first section, I recount...In the second section, I examine...In the final concluding section, I summarize my findings and put forth a series of implications.”

Each paper should have a final concluding section in which you BRIEFLY summarize the conclusions you have reached. Most importantly, in this section you should put forward some implications that are appropriate to your topic and your findings. Some papers will have import for a country’s domestic or external policies, regional security, international security, bilateral relations, and so forth. These implications SHOULD DERIVE from your analysis. They should not be a recount of every possible good idea you may have on a subject.

Each paper must introduce each section with appropriate section heads. (Microsoft Word has a format feature for first level, second level and third level headers.) This should be used judiciously, and not in excess. For your papers, you are likely to only use headers to introduce each section with possible use of headers if there are sub-sections. These are not decorations; rather, they are meant to help orient the reader to the structure of the paper and your argument and should follow exactly the roadmap in your introduction.

NEVER, EVER use the passive voice (e.g. “Militancy is used in Pakistan for a range of goals.”) Why? The passive voice allows you to be lazy and imprecise. WHO is using these militants? If you can’t identify an “agent” then you have not adequately addressed the issue in question. In general, authors who use the passive voice obfuscate the very issue they seek to clarify. Don’t do it.

Claims of fact must be buttressed by citation of relevant secondary scholarly sources or primary data. Err on the side of caution.

Finally, each paper should be answerable with recourse only to the prescribed readings in this course. I do not expect you to regurgitate what the authors have argued. Most of our readings present alternative views of the same subject. Therefore, I want you to mobilize authors' work critically rather than by rote. You may want to answer your question by presenting alternative arguments and proffering your own data-driven exposition of whose argument makes the most sense.

Papers must use appropriate citations and comply with Georgetown's honor code. Below is a suggested method of citation. You may use others if you choose, provided that you use complete citations (for the first occurrence) and cite them consistently.

Citation Methods

(Taken from the guidance provided by *International Security*, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/58/quarterly_journal.html?page_id=180&parent_id=46)

See *The Chicago Manual of Style* (<http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html>) for less common citation forms.

- For citations after the first full citation, do not use op. cit.; instead, use the author's name and a short form of the title, in the following format:

1. Albertini, *War of 1914*, pp. 180, 183.
2. Kaplan, "LeMay."
3. Posen, "Measuring the Conventional Balance," p. 70 n. 30.
4. Ibid., p. 72 [only where the immediately preceding note contains only the relevant reference].

- State or country name should follow the place of publication if ambiguous (Cambridge, : Ballinger) or not widely known (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., but New York: Knopf).
- Use standard abbreviation (Calif., Washington, D.C.), rather than USPS style (CA, MA).
- Anglicize foreign place names, but retain the standard English version of publisher's name (Moscow: Gospoltizdat, 1949).
- Avoid extracts, tables, and paragraphing in notes.

Notes Format

These examples demonstrate the basic note format; when in doubt, check *The Chicago Manual of Style* and provide all bibliographic information in a format that most closely resembles the following. Present notes as double-spaced endnotes.

Periodicals and Dailies

- Observe order and punctuation of elements.
- Include full author name and title.
- Give volume number, issue number and date, per publication's numbering and dating system.
- Note omission of usual comma after article title ending in question mark or exclamation point.

Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), p. 74.

Selig S. Harrison, "A Breakthrough in Afghanistan?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 51 (Summer 1983), p. 23.

Gerard C. Smith, "Time is Running Out," *Newsweek*, January 31, 1983, p. 8.

- For popular periodicals and dailies carrying no volume or issue numbers, note that parentheses are not needed around the date.
- Authors and page numbers should be included where available.
- Punctuation of titles should be copied exactly rather than conformed to *IS* style.

Books, Manuscripts:

Books:

- Note order of items.
- Note placement of punctuation.
- Use the author's full name.
- Provide full page number, that is, pp. 163-167, not "163-7":

John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 163-164.

Article or chapter in edited volume; note use of book's full title and subtitle:

Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," in Steven E. Miller, ed., *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy: An International Security Reader* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 211-229.

Volume in a series; use chapter where appropriate:

Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, Vol. II: *The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), Ch.7.

Annual; note the introduction and use of acronym:

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance, 1987-88* (London: IISS, 1987).

Translated and edited version; multivolume work:

Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 3 vols., trans. and ed., Isabella M. Massey (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 171.

Reprint/Revised/Enlarged edition: note "Dell" stands alone without "Books," but full name of a university press is given:

Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie, *From Crossbow to H-Bomb* (New York: Dell, 1962; rev. and enl. Ed., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973).

Paper in a series: Note the use of IISS acronym which has been introduced in an earlier note; “Summer 1983” per publisher’s dating system:

Desmond Ball, *Targeting for Strategic Deterrence*, Adelphi Paper No. 185 (London: IISS, Summer 1983), p. 1.

Unpublished paper or dissertation:

Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” paper presented at the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, October 15-16, 1982, p. 2.

Stephen W. Van Evera, “Causes of War” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984), p. 1.

Government report; subsequent citations may use U.S. GPO abbreviation:

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress*, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], p. 127.

Congressional reports; for testimony, list individual first:

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Mutual Security Act of 1956*, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 1956, S. Rept. 2273, p. 20.

Archival Material

Give the title of the cited item first and supply all the bibliographical dates necessary to permit identification and location of the source.

- Use consistent format throughout.
- Where there are repeated references to particular archives, introduce a short form for similar references in subsequent notes.

Leven C. Allen to Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 26, 1950, and memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, n.d., CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. 21, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives.